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Last month I wrote about the sharp decline in the success
rate for scientific research proposals submitted to the US
National Institutes of Health (NIH) and other agencies. That
column provoked numerous responses from both adminis-
trators of the funding organizations and life scientists. The
administrators, while not denying some of the problems I
discussed, argued that things aren’t quite as bad as they
seem, and that a large part of the difficulty stems from size-
able increases in the number of grant applications and the
amounts requested, rather than from poor choices in manag-
ing the doubling of the NIH budget that took place not long
ago. The scientists, on the other hand, all said that things
were even worse than I had claimed. 
Care has to be taken in drawing conclusions from either of
these sources. I’m sure that people who have experienced
difficulty in obtaining funding are more likely to respond to
that column than those who’ve had success. And administra-
tors probably feel the need to defend themselves, and their
agencies, from what they might, with some justification, see
as an attack by someone who doesn’t know the whole story
the way they do. 
Nevertheless, although I think both sets of comments are
useful, I also think both largely missed the point. People who
wrote to me were all concerned, in one way or another, with
the amount of money available for research and how it is
being allocated. That’s what seems to be on everybody’s
minds, and it’s certainly worth talking about. Whether or not
we’re allocating the available funding sensibly is something
that ought to be engaging officials as well as researchers in
an ongoing dialog about priorities in science. (But that
dialog isn’t taking place. Somehow it just seems easier to
keep asking for more money.) Yet, that wasn’t the main
point of the column. What concerns me is that, whether
there really is a crisis in scientific funding or not, the percep-
tion that there is – and believe me, that is the perception on
the part of just about every researcher I have talked to – has
crippled the peer-review system.
Peer review is the foundation of quality in science. It pre-
vents widespread cronyism and slowly weeds out unproduc-
tive lines of inquiry. But it requires that reviewers be both
fair and wise. When the perception is that there’s not nearly
enough money to fund even all of the highest-quality pro-
posals, a defensive turf-protection replaces a spirit of curios-
ity and egalitarianism. When it seems as if the primary job of
a reviewer is to eliminate most proposals rather than to fight
for the good ones, nit-picking replaces generosity. When the
feeling is that every dollar counts so much that no risks dare
be taken, conservatism and incremental advances get
rewarded at the expense of bold new ideas. And when all of
these things happen - and I believe they are happening, now,
in the US - then the system is broken. 
Societies based on scarcity tend to become hierarchical, with
a well-fed elite and starving masses. As can be seen from pub-
licly available data (http://grants1.nih.gov/grants/financial/
QA_Doubling_Period.doc), during the recent doubling of
the NIH budget over a seven-year period, the number of
investigators getting funded changed very little. Where did
the money go? Besides a very large increase in the funding
for NIH’s own intramural research program, it seems to
have gone to large increases in funding for established inves-
tigators who renewed their grants successfully during this
period, or wrote additional ones. Instead of bringing lots of
new people into the system, we ended up with more money
for roughly the same set of grant holders. Now that funding
is tight, those bloated operations are under tremendous
pressure to at least maintain their size, which makes it even
more difficult for new investigators - or new ideas - to enter
the system. The average age at which a scientist receives his
or her first NIH grant in the US is currently 42 for PhDs
(even older for MDs), and in this time of perceived scarcity a
broken peer-review system is not likely to change that. 
What’s the best way to fix things? It could be argued that the
problem is temporary, and that when funding loosens up
again, as it always has in past boom-bust cycles, peer reviewwill recover along with everything else. After all, that’s what
happened in the 1970s. No need to tamper with the system.
Time will take care of the problem.
I have my doubts. There’s one big difference between peer
review in 1975 and peer review today: the number of senior
investigators participating in the process. Back then most
review panels had a preponderance of such scientists, who
provided the system with institutional memory of the way
things were supposed to work. Nowadays, most established
investigators feel they are too busy to put in the considerable
time required to deal with the glut of proposals that every
panel faces. The result is that less experienced scientists,
with no history of a different gestalt, are being fed into a
system where fault-finding and conservatism are the norm,
so when the funding situation improves, there’s no guaran-
tee that the peer-review system will improve with it. (If you
doubt this, consider the former Soviet Union. When it col-
lapsed in 1989, newer Soviet-block countries like Poland and
Hungary and Czechoslovakia, where there was a generation
of people who still had a memory of how a market-based
economy should work, did much better than Russia, where
no one alive had experienced any system but communism.)
In addition, the insistence that the composition of the panels
must satisfy a requirement for geographic and institutional
balance means that it’s hard to have a large number of top
scientists on any panel, even if they wanted to serve.
So my first repair instruction is simple: Do away with the
misguided concept of balance, and require that all holders of
research grants serve at least one year on a reviewing panel
for every five years of funding they receive, regardless of
seniority. Renewal of funding would be contingent on fulfill-
ment of this service. If there is a surplus of available talent,
then grants administrators could forgive the obligation for
any given five-year cycle, but the requirement would kick in
again when a grant was renewed. There would need to be a
mechanism to deal with people who hold multiple grants -
perhaps they would only incur a single one year debt for
every five years of total funding, or the length of service
could scale with the total budget; these details can be worked
out. The important point is to create a pool of the best
researchers, and to make sure that they represent the major-
ity on all peer-review panels. As a dyed-in-the-wool advocate
of personal freedom, the coercive aspects of this suggestion
do trouble me somewhat, but it isn’t really all that different
from the way things work in the other main form of peer
review - the jury system. 
My second idea for how fix things is meant to address the
problem of reviewer morale. When someone is given twelve
grants to review, and knows that there is only a small proba-
bility that even the best one is actually going to be funded, he
or she rapidly becomes discouraged. It’s even more depress-
ing when some less knowledgeable reviewer nit-picks one’s
best proposals, and depression is not the best mindset from
which to make judgments. I suspect the program officers at
the funding agencies must feel equally demoralized: it’s no
fun having to say “no” all the time, and to watch conservative
study sections pass over the most exciting new ideas in favor
of more of the usual. The solution, I think, is to give the
program officers more autonomy in funding decisions. Some
NIH institutes and centers claim that they do this, but in
practice I have found that program officers rarely go against
the recommendations of the reviewing panels. I suggest
taking at least 10% of the budget of each institute or center
and allowing the program officers to use it to fund grants that
they believe to be exciting but that would otherwise miss the
payline cut-off. They would need to justify each decision to
the council, of course, but this suggestion would empower
them to rectify some of the worst mistakes of the panels. In
my experience, funding officials tend to be bright, committed
individuals with a good broad knowledge of their field; I have
no hesitation in giving them more autonomy. This is the way
things actually work at the National Science Foundation, a
funding agency that many believe has a better long-term
history of supporting innovative research than does the NIH. 
There also needs to be a way to improve the judgments
coming out of the panels. Having more experienced review-
ers would help, but it’s hard to deal thoroughly and fairly
with each proposal when the number being reviewed has
increased so greatly. The way to solve the problem of pro-
posal overload is to reduce proposal size. NIH proposals now
are limited to 25 pages for the scientific description (that
includes background and significance, progress during the
past budget period, and the plan for future research). I think
that should be shortened to 15 pages. If you can’t describe
clearly in 15 pages what you’ve already done, what you
intend to do, and why it’s important, you probably can’t do it
in 50. 
But I think the proposals should be structured differently for
different investigators. Scientists submitting their first pro-
posal need to spend more space detailing how they are plan-
ning to carry out the work than established investigators
should. In fact, I would argue that established investigators
shouldn’t have to describe their proposed methods in any
detail at all, except if these are novel. To ask someone who
has demonstrated for years that they can deliver the goods to
prove that they know what they’re doing is silly and borders
on insulting. It also provides the nit-pickers with extra
ammunition. People who tout stocks are constantly warning
investors that past performance is no guarantee of future
returns. But there is one area where it is: scientific research.
The best predictor I know of as to whether a project will
work is the track record of the principal investigator.
Someone who has been consistently successful is not likely
to fail, even when doing something risky. We need to stop
pretending that isn’t true. Most organizations that award
pre- and post-doctoral fellowships spend very little time
picking over the details of the applicant’s research proposal,
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experience writing proposals and anyway usually end up
doing something different, or in a very different way, from
what they propose. Instead, fellowship reviewers tend to
consider the qualities of the individual to be the most impor-
tant factor on which to base their judgments. I think that
makes sense at all levels of science. We need to be much less
concerned with the details of projects, and put our bets on
people and ideas. 
While we’re waiting for funding levels to improve, we need
additional mechanisms to get young people started. The
observation that, while investigator funding went way up
during the NIH budget doubling, the number of investiga-
tors changed very little, suggests that we should consider
putting a cap on the size of each award so as to make more
money available for funding new projects and people. This is
a serious matter, because it potentially has an impact on
current employees, so if we implement a cap we will need to
phase it in gradually. I am not proposing that we limit the
total amount of funding that an individual can have - I think
if someone can justify the need for millions of dollars to do
first-rate science they should be able to obtain it. But I do
think that we should exercise more scrutiny in such cases,
and one way to do that is to force someone who claims to
need, say, a million dollars to support a project to submit
two or three proposals instead of one. I also think we will do
better science, as a community, if we have more individual
investigator-initiated projects and fewer mega-sized ‘me-too’
programs. Most innovation comes from small projects by
relatively new people.
Two final ideas pertain to the machinery of the reviewing
process itself. Turf protection is one of the biggest problems
in peer review: as fields try to survive in a time of scarce
resources, they often fight to fund their own mediocre
science at the expense of quality in other areas. This largely
stems from the personal and professional relationships that
develop among members of a particular discipline. It’s less
of a problem when there’s more money to go around, but
right now we need to fight it. Here’s a heretical and possibly
crazy idea: I think we should consider not allowing people to
review grants in their own field. Instead, they should only be
allowed to comment on any questions of technical feasibility
that come up during the review. This may seem absurd, but
I’m not sure it is. If we follow my suggestion to bet on people
rather than projects, detailed technical expertise isn’t so
important. And if we have the best, most experienced people
back on our review panels, they usually will have a pretty
broad knowledge of genomics, or biology, or whatever the
main subject is. That will allow them to assess the impor-
tance of the proposed research and the impact of the appli-
cant’s previous contributions, which I maintain are the only
two criteria that really should matter. Reviewing outside
one’s primary area of technical expertise happens all the
time on fellowship panels, and they usually make pretty
good decisions. After all, you don’t have to be able to lay an
egg in order to tell a good one - or to smell a bad one. 
The second procedural change we should consider is aimed
at addressing the issue of possible bias in the system. In
times of scarce dollars, reviewers worried about their own
chances of obtaining funding have an incentive to prevent
others from being funded. Even if we assume such a thing
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Box 1
Repair instructions
Do away with the misguided concept of balance, and
require that all holders of research grants serve at
least one year on a reviewing panel for every five years
of funding they receive, regardless of seniority.
Give the program officers more autonomy in funding
decisions.
Take at least 10% of the budget of each institute or
center and allow the program officers to use it to fund
grants that they believe to be exciting but that would
otherwise miss the payline cut-off.
Solve the problem of proposal overload by reducing
proposal size.
The scientific description (that includes background
and significance, progress during the past budget
period, and the plan for future research) should be
limited to 15 pages.
Established investigators shouldn’t have to describe
their proposed methods in any detail at all, except if
these are novel.
Be much less concerned with the details of projects,
and put our bets on people and ideas. 
We should consider, as a community, the advisability
of putting a cap on the size of each award so as to
make more money available for funding new projects
and people.
We should also consider trying the idea of not
allowing people to review grants in their own field.
Instead, they should only be allowed to comment on
any questions of technical feasibility that come up
during the review.
Guarantee the quality of the peer-review process by
reviewing the reviewers.rarely happens, we should want to ensure that proposals are
reviewed wisely as well as fairly. I think the best way to
guarantee the quality of the peer-review process is to review
the reviewers. The data to do so exist, because there is a
record of how every member of a panel has voted on every
grant. Since most panelists only read their assigned propos-
als in detail, we need only be concerned with how a review-
er’s scoring of such applications compares with the average
score awarded to those same applications by the other
assigned reviewers. Abnormally high or low scores would
not be damning in and of themselves (there’s plenty of room
for legitimate differences of opinion in science) but a consis-
tent pattern of low or high scores could indicate either poor
judgment or bias. You may wonder how to be sure about
such an evaluation, but it’s actually easy, because we can
compare each reviewer with him or herself. Bias or territori-
ality should be relatively easy to detect by examining how a
suspect reviewer treats the same grants when they are resub-
mitted after revision. Since unsuccessful applicants try hard
to answer the criticisms raised by the previous review, the
scores of resubmitted grant proposals should improve, on
average. If a reviewer’s scoring on such resubmissions
remains abnormally low compared with other reviewers who
are also seeing the proposal for a second time, then there is
reason to question the impartiality, or the judgment, of that
reviewer, and they can be eased off the panel. There might
even be no need to evaluate every reviewer all the time:
random checking might be all that is needed to discourage
trying to rig the game.
When fear and discouragement drive peer-review decisions,
then the system is broken. But it’s not broken beyond repair.
The suggestions I’ve offered here can help mend it; at the
very least, I hope they will start a dialog about what should
be done. The worst thing we can do as a community is to
throw up our hands in despair or pretend that everything
will right itself magically when more money becomes avail-
able. Peer review is too important to give up on, or be left to
chance. If we’re serious about funding the best science and
making our profession attractive to the brightest, most cre-
ative young minds, then we need to fix the system so that it
once again serves those ends. Let’s get to work.
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